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Abstract. Interest in psychological experimentation from the Artificial Intelligence community often takes the 
form of rigorous post-hoc evaluation of completed computer models. Through an example of our own collaborative 
research, we advocate a different view of how psychology and AI may be mutually relevant, and propose an 
integrated approach to the study of learning in humans and machines. We begin with the problem of learning 
appropriate indices for storing and retrieving information from memory. From a planning task perspective, the 
most useful indices may be those that predict potential problems and access relevant plans in memory, improving 
the planner's ability to predict and avoid planning failures. This "predictive features" hypothesis is then supported 
as a psychological claim, with results showing that such features offer an advantage in terms of the selectivity of 
reminding because they more distinctively characterize planning situations where differing plans are appropriate. 
We present a specific case-based model of plan execution, RUNNER, along with its indices for recognizing 
when to select particular plans--appropriateness conditions--and how these predictive indices serve to enhance 
learning. We then discuss how this predictive features claim as implemented in the RUNNER model is then tested in 
a second set of psychological studies. The results show that learning appropriateness conditions results in greater 
success in recognizing when a past plan is in fact relevant in current processing, and produces more reliable recall 
of the related information. This form of collaboration has resulted in a unique integration of computational and 
empirical efforts to create a model of case-based learning. 
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1. Learning in humans and machines 
In many  machine  models  o f  learning, the goal  seems be the mimicking of  human  learning 
at the level  o f  input and output  behavior.  However ,  I /O match ing  is problemat ic  because  
human and mach ine  behaviors  are fundamenta l ly  different  in their envi ronments  and back- 
ground knowledge .  Even  in novel  domains,  it is nearly imposs ib le  to achieve access to 
large quantit ies o f  background knowledge  (as humans  do with p rob lem-so lv ing  strategies, 
analogical  remindings,  prior process ing contexts,  and episodic  traces o f  s imilar  events)  in 
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machine learners. How can humans and machines be performing the same processing given 
such different knowledge bases? One possible fix to this comparison problem is to equate 
background knowledge by choosing tasks where little or no knowledge is involved. This 
strategy was used in the development of EPAM (Feigenbaum, 1990) as a computer model of 
human verbal learning, where the input stimuli (nonsense syllables) are designed to provide 
little connection to past knowledge. However, EPAM involved a part of human behavior 
that is, by experimental design, far outside of the normal learning circumstances that an 
individual encounters in the world. When do people learn in the absence of any knowledge? 
Another alternative is to attempt to provide the machine with background knowledge for 
some task comparable to that of human subjects. When the domain is very restricted (e.g., 
inflating balloons (Pazzani, 1991)), this approach may be successful. However, in most 
domains (for example, in commonsense planning), there is no limited set of rules that can 
be considered sufficient. Without comparable knowledge bases, a machine learning model 
should be dissimilar to a human learner for the same reasons that a water plant near the Great 
Lakes is unlike one at the edge of the Gobi desert: they must produce the same product 
under extremely different operating circumstances. We face great difficulty in trying to 
"test" machine and human learners under similar conditions of environment, experience, 
and background knowledge. 
Therefore, we argue for the importance of testing not I/O performance, but paradigms. 
What needs "testing" is the underlying assumptions of any machine learning model--the 
specific processing claims of its approach that should obtain across other tasks and learning 
situations, and that distinguish the approach from other competing theories. Newell (1991) 
argues for this approach, suggesting that one should first determine whether one has the 
basics of the class of models that will work before worrying about exactly matching detailed 
behavior. By examining the assumptions of a computational model, we can determine its 
psychological plausibility while avoiding the temptation of repeatedly adjusting it in order 
to exactly match human behavior in a specific test task. 
In the following paper, we present an example of this approach to models of learning. 
We start with a problem: how does a case-based learner find relevant information in mem- 
ory? We begin with a hypothesis that the indices with predictive utility in the planning 
domain are those structural features that distinctively indicate when particular plans are 
appropriate. A series of studies with human learners is then presented, contributing an ex- 
planation of what role predictive features play in retrieval. We then examine one case-based 
learning model in particular, RUNNER, and describe the implementation of the predictive 
features hypothesis for plan execution called "appropriateness conditions." Finally, we 
present experiments designed to examine whether appropriateness conditions are effective 
in human learning. 
2. Predictive features hypothesis: What indices are learned? 
Previous research has demonstrated the utility of learning by analogy (Carbonell, 1983; 
Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Hammond, 1989; Pirolli & Anderson, 
1985; Ross, 1989). However, one must first retrieve a relevant candidate case from mem- 
ory. Given that memory is full of past experiences, only a small number of which may be 
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relevant, successful access requires identifying a past case with important similarities to 
the current situation, while distinguishing among other cases with similar features. How 
experiences are encoded into memory, and what types of cues may provide access to them, 
is called the indexing problem. How to find a relevant analog in memory is a central issue 
in research on analogical learning in psychology (Anderson, 1986; Gentner, 1983; Gentner 
& Landers, 1985; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Holyoak, 1985; Pirolli & Anderson, 1985; Rat- 
termann & Gentner, 1987; Ross, 1987; Ross, 1989; Seifert, McKoon, Abelson, & Ratcliff, 
1986). While most computational approaches have ignored the problem of retrieving past 
experiences, one approach----case-based learning (Hammond, 1989; Kolodner, 1985; Ries- 
beck & Schank, 1989)--has attempted to determine the type and source of features used to 
index cases in episodic memory during learning. 
2.1. Types of indices: Surface vs. structural 
By most psychological accounts, retrieval depends on how similar the new problem is to a 
target example stored in memory, given a context of other related competing cases (Ander- 
son, 1986; Gentner & Landers, 1985; Tversky, 1977). However, previous psychological 
research on indices has focused on a single factor in explaining when access occurs: the 
abstractness of the features (Gentner, 1983; Holyoak, 1985). Specifically, features that 
are more superficially (surface) related to the intended analogical meaning are contrasted 
with features that involve more deep, thematic (structural) relations among pattern ele- 
ments (Gentner, 1983; Ross, 1987). Gentner (Gentner & Landers, 1985; Rattermann & 
Gentner, 1987) has found that surface features result in more frequent access in a memory 
retrieval task, and Ross (1987) has demonstrated that different kinds of surface similarity 
(story line versus object correspondence) lead to different rates of access. One possible 
explanation for these results is that the ability to make use of structural features is limited 
even when they are available; however, this does not appear to be the case. In these same 
studies, more abstract, relational features also reliably produced access to past cases based 
on structural features alone (Gentner & Landers, 1985; Rattermann & Gentner, 1987; Ross, 
1987). Other studies have also shown activation of prior cases in memory based solely 
on abstract, thematic cues, particularly if subjects are instructed to attend to them (Seifert 
et al, 1986). 
Why, then, do superficial features appear to promote better case access compared to ab- 
stract features? Surface features may be more readily available (require less inference) 
than structural features, playing a role in memory access before any abstract features are 
even available (Hammond & Seifert, 1992). Surface features may also serve to identify 
prior examples when individual cases are unique in content within the memory set (as in 
Rattermann and Gentner, 1987, where there was only one base "squirrel" story in mem- 
ory). Unfortunately, in many real-world domains, there is substantial overlap of surface 
features between cases, so that abstract features are particularly important. For example, 
access based on structural features alone may be necessary when learning in a new do- 
main, where past experiences won't share many surface features with new problems. In 
these cross-contextual remindings (Schank, 1982), abstract strategies from ,one domain are 
applied in another, such as taking the "fork" strategy from chess and developing it as the 
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"option" play in football (Collins, 1987). Access to past information based on abstract 
features is particularly important when the common features are incomplete or ambiguous 
(Seifert, 1992). 
The capacity to learn a general principle in one setting and transfer it to other, non- 
superficially related settings, is the essence of intelligent behavior. Even if people are only 
rarely able to make use of structural features, it is critical that we determine when such 
transfer does occur, and how we might accomplish this process in machine learners. 
2.2. Useful indices: Causal vs. correlated 
Our research on planning suggests that structural indices--those representing the abstract 
relationships among goals and plans--serve to constrain plan choices in a given situation 
(Hammond, 1989; Hammond & Seifert, 1992). Because this causal information serves to 
distinctly identify types of planning problems, the types of solution strategies that can be 
applied, and potential failures to avoid, it also provides useful indices to past plans. Thus, 
our claim is that among all possible features in a planning situation, only a limited set of 
these features--those that are relevant to the way in which the current causal interaction of 
goals and plans can be changed---are predictive of planning constraints, and therefore most 
useful as indices. 
Two examples illustrate features most useful in predicting when plan knowledge is ap- 
propriate: 
Flight of the Phoenix 
X was working late on a project that was due in a matter of days. As he saw the 
deadline approach, he considered the following two plans: either continue to work 
straight through the night (and the next day) or get a good night's sleep and come 
back to the office refreshed. The first plan allows the use of all of the time for work 
on the project. The second provides less time, but the time it does provide is of a 
better quality. 
While thinking about his problem, X was reminded of a scene from the movie 
"Flight of the Phoenix" in which a character played by Jimmy Stewart had to start a 
damaged plane in the desert. The plane's ignition needed explosive cartridges, and 
Stewart had only seven left. The plane's exhaust tubes were also filled with sand, 
which had to be blasted out using the same explosive cartridges. Stewart's character 
was faced with a choice: either try to start the plane using all the cartridges directly, 
or use some of them to clear the exhaust tubes to enhance the overall utility of the 
other cartridges. Stewart decided to use some of the cartridges to clear the lines, 
thus optimizing the likelihood of success for the remaining cartridges in starting 
the engine. 
This situation involves a specific type of resource conflict, and the reminding carries with 
it information about how to make the decision. In the next example, the reminding is much 
more concretely related to the task at hand: 
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Missed Exit 
Y was driving along an expressway in the left lane, because traffic was moving 
faster there. He spotted the exit where he wanted to get off. Unfortunately, by the 
time he worked his way into the right-hand lane, he had missed the exit. 
The next time Y was driving on the same expressway in the left lane, intending to 
get off at the same exit, he again remembered the exit too late to make the exit, but 
noticed it had been preceded by a large billboard advertising "Webber's Inn." 
The third time, Y noticed the billboard, remembered the exit, and got into the right 
lane in time to make the exit. 
In the Flight of the Phoenix example, the movie situation shares no surface features with 
the write-or-sleep decision, but on the structural level the two situations match exactly: 
Each protagonist has a goal and a limited resource and must decide between two plans for 
using the resource; one plan uses the resource directly in service of the goal, while the 
other splits the resource between an optimization step and a direct-use step. These features 
suggest the solution of focusing attention on the question of whether sleeping would leave 
enough time to complete the project. 
In the Missed Exit example, the features used in indexing are much more concretely related 
to the task at hand. Rather than predicting a causal relationship, the billboard simply serves 
as a correlated feature that is easier to notice. Structurally, the problem is to optimize over 
two goals: drive fast (hence drive in the left lane), and get off at the right place; however, 
a structure-level "solution" would look like "Move into the right-hand lane only when you 
need to," which does not provide detectable features. By recalling the earlier failures, Y 
is able to modify the features used to retrieve the exit goal from memory so as to make 
optimal use of observable surface features that are correlated with the presence of the exit. 
Through experience, non-causally related features that predict the desired c]hoice point can 
also be learned. 
These two examples represent opposite ends of the causal spectrum--in one, the features 
are predictive because they are causally related; in the other, the features are predictive 
because they happen to be correlated with the desired event. Thus, predictiveness is not an 
inherent feature of the indices themselves, such as "surface" or "structural" properties, but of 
the relative role played in characterizing episodes within a domain (Seifert, 11988). In some 
situations, surface features alone may be sufficient to predict what past knowledge should 
be accessed. For example, in learning several rules of statistics, retrieving past examples 
based on surface features like "the smaller set being mapped onto the larger one" may be 
sufficient for the learner's purposes (Ross, 1989). In other situations, structural features 
may be the only constants available across a variety of planning situations. Together, these 
examples present challenges that any model of learning must be capable of answering. 
The point of these examples is that indexing of information will occur based on any 
and all predictive features within the task context. Structural feature remindings may be 
more likely to carry information needed to solve complex problems, while surface-level 
remindings may be more likely to help us react quickly to our environment. In both cases, 
the indexing features can be expected to consist of those that reliably predict the utility of 
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the retrieved information. This suggests that indexing should be based on any features that 
are apparent to the planner at the time when retrieval would be useful. 
3. Predictive features in human learning 
In human learning, is memory access possible through a subset of structural features that help 
to select plans? From a functional perspective, prior cases must be indexed using features 
that will be readily apparent to the processor at the time when retrieval is desired. In planning 
situations, this point may be defined as when conditions and constraints are known, but a 
decision has not yet been made. That way, the retrieved plan can suggest possible solutions 
or warn of potential dangers while the situation outcome is yet undetermined. Features 
that predict when prior cases might be useful could be better retrieval cues because they 
more specifically describe relevant planning constraints in the current processing context. If  
human memory is indeed operating under the predictive features hypothesis, features related 
to when plans are relevant should lead to better access to past experiences in memory than 
other, equally associated features. 
For example, consider this story: 
A chemist was trying to create a new compound designed to allow preservation of 
dairy products stored at room temperature. The chemist was so confident that his 
experiments would succeed that he went ahead and ordered several truckloads of 
fresh dairy products to be delivered to demonstrate the utility of the new compound. 
This story contains features with predictive utility; that is, the features present in the 
story allow the retrieval of past experience and predict a possible planning failure before 
the complete structural analog (namely, counting your chickens before they're hatched) is 
even available. 
In order to examine the issue of predictive features in indexing, we conducted several 
experiments (as reported in Johnson & Seifert, 1992) comparing the retrieval of prior 
cases based on structural cues. The critical question is, are some subsets (cues predictive of 
planning failures) better than other (equally similar) cue subsets in retrieving prior cases? A 
set of common structural features was determined within narrative stories based on common 
cultural adages such as "closing the barn door after the horse is gone" (Seifert, McKoon, 
Abelson, & Ratcliff, 1986). These themes are based on knowledge about problems in 
planning that can occur, and how to avoid or solve them (Lehnert, 1980; Dyer, 1983), and 
so are also likely to be familiar patterns to subjects. 
According to the predictive features hypothesis, structural features involving planning 
errors should form a privileged subset that leads to more successful case access than would 
be attained using other sets of features. Other shared structural features should be less 
useful as indices. To test this claim, we used a reminding paradigm based on Gentner and 
Landers (1985). Previous studies established that this retrieval task paradigm produces 
results similar to problem-solving tasks (Ross, 1989). In the current experiments, retrieval 
alone served as the dependent measure, but the stories all involved planning content. In a 
single experimental session, subjects were given a set of base stories to read. After a ten 
minute distractor task, subjects were given a set of cue stories and asked to write down any 
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Table 1. Example feature sets for the Chemist story. 
Theme: Counting your chickens before they're hatched. 
Base story elements: 
1) X desires A. 
2) X assumes A. 
3) X does not act to ensure A. 
4) X invests resources based on A. 
5) A does not occur. 
6) X has wasted resources. 




base stories that came to mind. The cues used in the experiments were of  three types: a 
complete-theme cue, a predict-theme cue, and an outcome-theme cue. Table 1 shows the 
abstract features for one of the themes used, and which of  those features each cue story 
type contained. 
The critical decision point precedes the action of going ahead and investing resources 
based on anticipated success. It is before taking this action that one can make a choice 
of  pursuing a different plan. Once made, one has committed to "counting the chickens," 
whether or not they hatch as planned. Therefore, the failure itself is not considered a 
predictive feature, since its presence already determines the set of  outcomes. The predictive 
features set contained thematically-matching information up to the point of  a planning 
decision; the other, conclusion features set included the thematically matching information 
from the point of  decision through the outcome of the story. Examples of  the stories used 
in the experiments are given in Table 2. 
Each of the cue stories was followed by instructions taken from Gentner and Landers 
(1985): "If  this story reminds you of  a story from the first part of the experiment, please write 
out the matching story as completely as you can. Try to include the names of  characters, their 
motives, and what happened." The responses were scored based on whether they matched 
the intended base story, matched a different study story, matched no study stories, or was left 
blank. The rate of  remindings was compared to chance estimates, one of  which measured 
the probability of  access given demonstrated availability in free recall for each subject. 
The results showed that, while both subsets of cues resulted in reliable retrieval of  study 
stories, the cue set that included features predictive of a planning decision proved to contain 
better cues than the set including the planning decisions themselves and their outcomes. The 
main findings were that there were no differences in the number of matches for predictive and 
outcome cues. However, only predictive cues were matched at a higher-than-chance level 
because the predict-theme cues led to significantly fewer responses involving mismatched 
stories than did outcome features. Therefore, the stories containing predictive features led 
to more reliable access to matching stories in memory. 
In follow-up experiments, we asked subjects to directly compare each type of  partial cue 
to the base stories used in the experiments to determine whether the cues were differentially 
distinguishing the base stories, based on a) an overall similarity judgment not biased towards 
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Table 2. Example Study and Cue Stories in the Experiments. 
Sample study story: 
Judy was overjoyed about the fact that she was pregnant. She looked forward to having a baby boy, and wanted 
one so badly she felt absolutely certain it would be male. As a result, she bought all kinds of toy cars, trucks, 
miniature army soldiers, and even arranged an extravagant "It's a boy" party. Finally, the big moment came, 
and she was rushed to the hospital. Everything went smoothly in the delivery room, and at last she knew. 
Judy's lively bouncing baby was actually a girl. 
Complete-theme test cue: 
Harrison disliked his small apartment and shabby furniture. His rich aunt Agatha was near death, and although 
he hadn't seen or spoken to her in 15 years, he felt assured of inheriting a great fortune very shortly because 
he was her only living relative. He had already thought of plenty of ways to spend a lot of money fixing his 
place up. Confident of his inheritance, Harrison began charging everything from color televisions to cars to 
gourmet groceries. When Aunt Agatha finally died and her will was read, she had left all her millions to the 
butler and now Harrison was in debt. 
Predict-theme test cue: 
Harrison disliked his small apartment and shabby furniture. His rich aunt Agatha was near death, and although 
he hadn't seen or spoken to her in 15 years, he felt assured of inheriting a great fortune very shortly because 
he was her only living relative. He had already thought of plenty of ways to spend a lot of money fixing his 
place up. 
Outcome-theme test cue: 
Confident of his inheritance, Harrison began charging everything from color televisions to cars to gourmet 
groceries. When Aunt Agatha finally died and her will was read, she had left all her millions to the butler and 
now Harrison was in debt. 
themes and b) thematic similarity (using thematic similarity instructions for the rating task 
from Gentner  and Landers  (1985)). The results showed that subjects rated the sets of  
pre-decis ion (predictive) cues and the sets of  decision and post-decision (outcome) cues 
as equal ly similar to the base stories, whether us ing jus t  thematic or overall s imilari ty as 
a standard; thus, the reminding  results are not due to any differences in length of cue or 
amoun t  of informat ion in the two types of  cues. 
In a final experiment,  we asked subjects to match pre-decision stories and post-decis ion 
stories to the base stories, as in the second experiment,  except that the subjects directly 
compared the stories rather than using the partial cue stories to retrieve base stories f rom 
memory.  The results showed that the pre-decision cues produced more reliable matches than 
the decis ion and post-decision cues. Predictive features thus appear to more  distinctively 
characterize relevant p lanning  situations, leading to remindings  appropriately specific to the 
p lann ing  decision, and few other remindings.  The predictive features better characterize 
individual  themes as distinct f rom other themes. Whi le  both the predict- theme and the 
theme-outcome cues were found to provide reliable access to matching cases, the predictive 
features showed an advantage in terms of the selectivity of  reminding.  This indicates that 
the e lements  in the predict- theme stories dist inguished the themes more  clearly, and thus 
subjects tended either to find the right story or to retrieve nothing. The theme-outcomes ,  
however, tended to evoke a wider range of  intrusion responses, indicat ing that the features 
available in them were also shared by other potentially retrievable episodes. Causal  features 
involving goal and plan interactions will, when encoded, dist inguish among  si tuations where  
different plans will be  appropriately applied. 
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4. Predictive features in case-based models 
In the following section, we describe current research on a specific model of indexing in case- 
based learning, RUNNER, which incorporates this notion of the predictive features needed 
for successful indexing. Like other case-based systems (Alterman, 1985; Hammond, 1989; 
Kolodner, 1985; Kolodner & Simpson, 1989; Simpson, 1985; Riesbeck & Schank, 1989), 
RUNNER makes the following basic claims: 
• New solutions are built from old solutions. 
• Intelligent learning arises from anticipation of difficulties and optimizations based on 
prior experience. 
• Prior experiences are selected from memory through matching indices. 
• Useful indices in the planning domain involve features of goals, features associated 
with past successes, and features predicting problems to avoid. 
A distinctive thrust of this case-based approach to learning (as opposed to other types of 
AI systems) is the incorporation of"lessons learned" into memory so that past errors can be 
retrieved and avoided appropriately. Case-based learners accomplish this through a specific 
strategy: anticipate and avoid problems. To do this, case-based learners keep track of the 
features in their domains that are predictive of particular problems, so those problems can 
be anticipated in future situations where they are likely to arise. As a result, the use of 
predictive features in indexing allows a case-based learner to find relevant past experiences 
in memory, thereby providing the chance to bootstrap from experience. Thus, learning is 
supported by the ability to store and access actual past problems, rather than attempting to 
anticipate through all possible ones (as in search models such as SOAR (Newell, 1991)). 
In case-based learning, experiences encoded into the memory base reflect the structure of 
a domain (e.g., more examples of the goals that tend to arise in conjunction, the interactions 
between steps that tend to occur, and successful solutions) and are built up, incrementally 
through learning. This approach involves the study of the actual content of features used 
in the organization of memory. In particular, we are interested in the type of features that 
may be predictive within a particular knowledge domain and task. A processor would 
benefit from retrieving related past cases at any time that they can provide information that 
is helpful in the current situation. 
4.1. Predictive features in planning: Appropriateness conditions 
Our argument has been that it is not possible to characterize the utility of indices on the 
basis of inherent type (e.g. surface vs. structural). Rather, the types of indices that turn 
out to be predictive depend strongly on the domain, the task, and the type of processing 
normally performed for the task. 
The RUNNER project focuses on questions of retrieval in the context of routine plan 
execution. In this task, predictive features are those indices that signal that a particular plan 
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may be used with success, and should be attempted. The problem of plan use is somewhat 
different than the more general problem of planning--in particular, retrieval of standard 
plans in routine situations can often be more directly tied to perceptually available features, 
and this is advantageous if it can increase the efficiency of a frequently-used plan. 
It might seem that the indices appropriate for plan retrieval are simply the preconditions 
of the plan, since a plan can be executed when its preconditions are satisfied, and not 
otherwise. However, some preconditions are not at all predictive of plan relevance; for 
example, "having money" is a precondition for many plans, yet having this precondition 
met does not necessarily predict a prime occasion for executing any of these plans. Instead, it 
would be useful to learn those features that should be explicitly considered when deciding 
whether to embark on a given plan. These appropriateness conditions provide memory 
access to the plan itself when circumstances are favorable to plan execution. 
The plan then serves both as a memory organization point for annotations about the 
current progress and problems of the use of the plan, and as a hook on which to hang past 
experiences of its use. Its appropriateness conditions determine whether it is relevant to 
selecting current actions to be executed. 
4.2. Appropriateness conditions in RUNNER 
Learning in many domains can be characterized as the acquisition and refinement of a 
library of plans. "Plan" refers to the collection of explicitly represented knowledge that is 
specifically relevant to repeated satisfaction of a given set of goals, and which influences 
action only when a decision has been made to use it. The plans in the library that are used 
will be incrementally debugged and optimized for the sets of conjunctive goals that typically 
recur (Hammond, 1989). The RUNNER project centers around plan use in a commonsense 
domain. By examining case-based learning within a planning task, we have uncovered a 
specific indexing vocabulary related to the control of action in the world. 
The representational system for RUNNER's memory, as well as the bulk of the algorithm for 
marker-passing and activation, is based on Charles Martin's work on the D M A P  parser (see 
(Martin, 1990). The memory of RUNNER's agent is encoded in semantic nets representing 
its plans, goals, and current beliefs. Each node in RUNNER'S plan net has associated with 
it a (disjunctive) set of concept sequences, which are a (conjunctive) listing of states that 
should be detected before that plan node can be suggested. 
In the plan network, this amounts to a nonlinear hierarchical plan net, where the acti- 
vation of plan steps (that are not ordered with respect to each other) can be dependent on 
environmental cues that indicate a particularly good time to perform that step. 
Nodes in the plan net become activated in the following ways: 
"Top-level" (the basic level instantiating different action sequences) plans become ac- 
tivated when the goal they serve is activated, and a concept sequence indicating appro- 
priate conditions is completed. 
Specializations of plans are activated by receiving apermission marker from the abstract 
plan, in addition to the activation of a concept sequence. 
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• Parts (or steps) of plans are also activated by completion of a concept sequence, and by 
receiving a permission marker from their parent. 
Once activated, many plans have early explicit verification steps which check if other 
conditions necessary for success are fulfilled, and abort the plan if not. Passing of per- 
mission markers is not recursive, so that the state information indicating an opportunity to 
perform a sub-plan must be recognized for execution to proceed further. This means that 
individual sub-plans must have associated with them concept sequences that indicate op- 
portunities to be performed. (For a more complete explication, see (Hammond, Converse, 
& Martin, 1990)). 
As an example, RUNNERS plan for making coffee involves a number of steps, many of 
which are independent in terms of ordering. Among these is a step for taking a filter from a 
box of filters and installing it in the coffeemaker. When the coffee plan becomes active, this 
step and others receive permission markers from the plan, which means that they can now 
be activated if they "see" one of their concept sequences completed. One of the sequences 
for the filter-installing step is simply the conjunction of seeing the filter box and being close 
to it. This activates the plan to install the filter. After doing one perceptual check (that there 
are indeed filters in the box), the step is performed. This style of sub-plan activation has 
the advantage that opportunities to perform steps can be taken without having explicitly 
planned the opportunity. 
Appropriateness conditions in RUNNER, then, are the union of the concept sequences of 
plan nodes and any initial verification steps required. Recognizing situations under which 
it is appropriate to invoke a plan is handled by testing the set of preconditions for the 
plan. Under assumptions of perfect knowledge and a closed world, there is little divergence 
between preconditions and the appropriateness conditions. When these assumptions are 
relaxed, however, there are several different ways in which the divergence can become 
important in plan execution and reuse: 
A precondition can effectively be "always true". This means that the plan may depend 
upon it for correctness, but an executor will never run into trouble by not worrying 
about its truth value. This sort of fact should not be an "appropriateness condition" 
since consideration of it cannot help in the decision whether to use the plan. 
A precondition may be almost always true, and it may be difficult to know or check in 
advance. If the consequences of an abortive attempt at performing the plan are not too 
severe, then this sort of fact should not be an appropriateness condition since the utility 
of knowing its truth is outweighed by the cost of acquiring the knowledge. 
A precondition may be intermittently true, but may be easily "subgoaled on" in execu- 
tion, and achieved if false. (This of course depends strongly on representation of plans, 
and how flexible the execution is.) To the extent this can be handled in "execution", the 
condition should not be an appropriateness condition since whether or not the condition 
holds, the plan is likely to succeed. 
• A particular condition may not be a precondition p e r  se, but may be evidence that the 
plan will be particularly easy to perform, or will produce results that are preferable to the 
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usual default plan for the relevant goals. This should be an appropriateness condition, 
even though it is not a precondition. 
The power of appropriateness conditions is that they help to select the set of features that 
an agent should consider before deciding on a given plan. a This predictive features set is 
interestingly different from both the (possibly infinite) set of facts that need to be true for 
the plan to work, and also the set of facts explicitly used in the plan's construction. Even if 
an agent is assumed to have immutable plans in memory that will determine its competence, 
there is still room for learning the particular appropriateness conditions that govern when to 
invoke particular plans. The set of predictive features for indexing in RUNNER, then, is the 
set of appropriateness conditions needed to identify when a potential plan may be relevant. 
4.3. The predictive utility of appropriateness conditions 
Predictive yet only probabilistic conditions are included as appropriateness conditions even 
though they are not true preconditions because they are a concern of the agent in deciding 
on the viability of a plan. Here, as with the indexing of plans and repairs (Hammond, 1991), 
actions need to be indexed by the conditions that favor their applicability. As new conditions 
are learned and others are found to be unreliable, this set of predictive features changes. 
Part of the process of refining appropriateness conditions can be taken care of by rela- 
tively simple "recategorization" of various conditions in the taxonomy sketched above, in 
response to both failure and unexpected success. Here are some ways in which this sort of 
recategorization can be applied: 
Drop appropriateness conditions that turn out to be always true. At its simplest, this is 
merely a matter of keeping statistics on verification steps at the beginning of plans. 
If a plan fails because some sub-plan of it fails, and that sub-plan failed because some 
appropriateness condition didn't hold, then promote that condition to the status of an 
appropriateness condition for the superordinate plan. That is, make the use of the larger 
plan contingent on finding the condition to be true. 
If a plan is frequently found to have false appropriateness conditions in situations where 
the plan is needed, and the conditions are under the agent's control, consider including 
the conditions in an enforcement plan that maintains them, so that the conditions can 
then be assumed true for that plan. 
At present, the RUNNER program reliably handles the first two types of learning listed 
above, and both of them are entirely empirical. That is, RUNNER starts to omit particular 
sensory verification steps when they turn out to be always true, and, when possible, RUNNER 
verifies conditions that have turned out to determine failure of a plan before undertaking 
the body of the plan. Continuing research on the problem of recognizing opportunities for 
enforcing conditions will focus on prioritizing learning for goals considered most important. 
A major part of learning to plan effectively, then, is the development of a library of 
conjunctive goal plans, and the simultaneous tuning of the plans, their appropriateness 
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conditions, and the environment itself to maximize the effectiveness of the plans. 
approach requires: 
This 
1. having a plan library with optimized plans for the different sets of goals that typically 
recur; 
2. for each plan, using indices consisting of appropriateness conditions, which are easily 
detectable and indicate the conditions under which the plan is appropriate; 
3. enforcing standard preconditions so that they can be assumed true. 
Thus, in RUNNER, predictive features are determined by separating preconditions that 
define the plan structure from the conditions that signal appropriate use of the plans. This 
separation allows tuning the conditions under which an agent will consider a given plan 
independent of its defined structure. This learning process improves the match between an 
environment and use and reuse of a library of plans in memory. Vocabularies for indexing 
(the appropriateness conditions in RUNNER) are thus designed to index actions in terms of 
the circumstances that favor their utility. 
This type of utility assessment is distinguished from the type of consideration done in 
systems such as PRODIGY (Minton, 1988) in two ways. First, the assessement done in 
RUNNER concerns the utility of the features used to control the access of plans rather than 
the utility of the plans themselves. This allows RUNNER to actually store and reuse plans 
that might not be useful in general but are highly applicable in specific situations. Second, 
RUNNER'S assessement is incremental and does not depend on the existence of a complete 
domain model. As such, it also allows the system to both remove and promote features to 
appropriateness status. 
5. Indexing plans in human learning 
Predictive features were found to show an advantage in terms of the selectivity of reminding, 
producing more reliable recall of related information. This predictive features hypothesis 
was then implemented in the case-based model RUNNER. These "appropriateness condi- 
tions" identified structural planning features that indicate when a relevant plan should be 
selected. Because of the variation in surface content in planning problems, the features one 
must recognize to access past plans will often be ones that relate to the causal structure of 
the planning situation. These appropriateness conditions should include the same features 
a planner needs to detect and monitor anyway during the planning process. 
Two experiments were conducted to explore the effect of explicitly teaching the appro- 
priateness conditions for two plans within a complex lesson (see Vanderstoep & Seifert, 
1992). Rather than using specific examples from the RUNNER project, which require a lot 
of interaction with the environment during planning, we chose stimuli that had the same 
critical properties: a variety of features could be used to index the plans in memory; a 
set of structural features are present; and a subset of these features could be identified as 
"appropriateness conditions" that predict when a particular plan is appropriate for execu- 
tion. Our domain involved elementary probability theory, which has been shown to produce 
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Table 3. Examples of the two similar probability problems. 
Permutations problem: An art contest has 10 artists who have entered a painting. Two awards will be given: 
one to the first-place artist and one to the second-place artist. How many different ways can the artists win the 
awards? 
Combinations problem: An art contest gives away three awards each year for "Outstanding Young Artist" 
All of the awards are identical--a $100 cash prize. There are 15 artists who are eligible for this award. How 
many different ways can the eligible artists win the three awards? 
learning of a variety of indexing features to retrieve relevant probability principles (Ross, 
1989). These prior studies demonstrated that human learners can and do attend to both 
structural features and surface features in order to select a relevant principle. However, the 
paradigm also provides a testbed for the role of appropriateness conditions in plan selec- 
tion: Will the presence of structural features predicting when a plan may be used facilitate 
human learning? 
In these experiments, subjects studied either a similar pair of principles (combinations and 
permutations) or a dissimilar pair of principles (combinations and conditional probability) 
through example problems and formulas. Examples of the similar principles are given in 
Table 3. 
The primary manipulation was whether or not learners received information regarding 
the appropriateness conditions that indicate when to apply each principle. For these plans, 
the appropriateness conditions were defined as whether the order of the set is considered 
when counting the number of possibilities. Half of the subjects received appropriateness 
conditions information that identified what aspects of the problem (whether the order of the 
objects in the sets being counted was important) determined when each of the principles 
should be used. The other half of the subjects received no instructions on appropriateness 
conditions, but were asked to review the study information for an equal time interval. It is 
hypothesized that when people are learning principles that are very similar to each other 
(i.e., easily confused), knowledge of the appropriateness conditions of the principles will 
be very important for learning to apply the principles. Will instructing learners about the 
appropriateness conditions of these problem-solving principles improve later performance? 
The answers to the test problems were scored for correctness using a system similar to 
Ross (1989). The two groups showed no differences in the number of problems completed 
accurately. However, subjects instructed about the appropriateness conditions made fewer 
confusion errors than subjects in the review-only condition whenever a similar problem pair 
was used; however, this instructional manipulation had no effect when a dissimilar problem 
pair was used. 
Why did the appropriateness conditions group make fewer errors than the review-only 
group? Consider that performance on this problem-solving task is a function of 1) recog- 
nizing the appropriate principle, and 2) remembering the specific content of the procedure 
(e.g., in a mathematical problem-solving task, the particular variables and how they are 
arranged in the formula), and 3) using the principle correctly in the new problem. Because 
the appropriateness conditions subjects made fewer errors, but they did not solve more prob- 
lems correctly, the instructions may have improved just the ability to identify when  to apply 
a procedure, but may not improve memory for the formula, or the ability to implement it. 
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A second experiment examined this notion by testing subjects' selection of a principle for 
a new problem separate from their ability to execute the plan correctly. Subjects learned two 
of three principles of probability theory using the same materials as in the first experiment. 
However, instead of asking subjects to solve the test problems (as in Experiment 1), in this 
experiment they were told simply to select the formula (by name) among four response 
choices: the names of the two principles the subjects studied, along with the formulas, 
"neither formula" and "don't know (can't remember)." Finally, they were asked to provide 
an explanation for their answer. 
The subjects informed about the appropriateness conditions did in fact perform better at the 
more specific task of selecting when to use each formula. No difference was, found between 
the appropriateness conditions group and the review-only condition for low-similarity prob- 
lems. However, subjects informed about appropriateness conditions did better than subjects 
in the review-only condition at selecting the correct planning principle to use. The results 
also suggest that subjects informed about the appropriateness conditions provided signifi- 
cantly better explanations for their answers than subjects in the review-only condition. In 
both the high-similarity and low-similarity pairs, no differences were found between the 
review-only and the appropriateness conditions groups for memory of any of the formulas. 
These studies support the notion that instructions on appropriateness conditions facilitate 
the selection of appropriate solution procedures in solving probability problems. With the 
appropriateness conditions instructions, subjects received information about the importance 
of the order of the objects, how to identify when order is or is not important, and when 
each principle should be applied. When learners were provided with this information, 
they were more likely to correctly detect situations when each formula should be used. 
These experiments show that when plans are similar, providing appropriateness conditions 
instructions does improve selection performance while not affecting memory for the formula 
or the ability to instantiate the formula correctly in a target problem. 
Although it may seem intuitively obvious that teaching appropriateness conditions would 
be helpful, instruction is not often designed like this. Consider how these same principles 
might be presented in a probability textbook. Permutations might be taught in one section, 
followed by combinations taught in the next section. Students could become proficient at 
solving each of the two different types of problems; however, without explicit instruction 
on what makes a certain problem a permutations problem and what makes maother problem 
a combinations problem, learners may have inadequate knowledge of when each formula 
should be applied. 
These results confirm the predictive features hypothesis, and illustrate the need for appro- 
priateness conditions when learning in a domain with similar plans. Much ,of the previous 
work on memory retrieval of analogies and cases has focused on the features that deter- 
mine similarity; however, these results suggest distinctiveness, as well as similarity, is very 
important for recognizing when to apply prior knowledge. 
6. Implications for indexing in learning models 
Our computational and empirical results have shown that plans are indexed in memory based 
on the features that predict their applicability. These results confirm the predictive features 
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hypothesis as developed in the RUNNER model, and serve as strong verification of the 
case-based learning approach as a psychological model. When indexing cases in memory, 
appropriateness conditions--indices related to when to consider a particular plan--are 
more useful than equally related information that is not helpful in distinguishing among 
plan options. Thus, from a functional perspective, the most useful features would be those 
that let one predict and access potential problems and solutions whenever they are relevant 
to current processing. This definition of predictive features constrains the set of indices 
one might propose for a computational model using past experiences, and also serves as a 
hypothesis for the features expected to be evident in human learning. 
Past approaches have suggested that the level of abstraction of indexing features, in 
terms of the surface versus structural dichotomy, predicts what features will be helpful in 
learning by analogy (Gentner & Landers, 1985; Rattermann & Gentner, 1987; Ross, 1987). 
However, the evidence from the experiments using structural features presented here, and 
from the performance based on structural features in RUNNER, suggests that all structural 
features are not the same; instead, the distinctiveness--the ability to select among related 
plans--of a subset of structural features, and not the overall similarity or abstractness, 
determines valuable indices in memory. 
Specifying predictive features in a task domain requires establishing the causality inherent 
in the domain for characterizing plan examples, and identifying both surface and structural 
features that are predictive of important decisions within the task context. By using a causal 
analysis of the goal interactions as indices for storing planning information in memory, it 
is possible to access plan strategies applicable to the problem (Hammond & Seifert, 1992). 
These strategies provide the planner with alteration techniques and information as to what 
parts of the initial causal configuration are appropriate targets of change, leading to specific 
plans for the current situation. This type of causal feature vocabulary has been incorporated 
into models that design tools for programs (Birnbaum & Collins, 1988), plan in the cooking 
domain (Hammond, 1989; Kolodner, 1987), plan radiation treatments (Berger & Hammond, 
1991), schedule deliveries (Hammond, Marks, & Converse, 1988), run errands (Hammond, 
Converse, & Martin, 1990), and learn geometry (McDougal & Hammond, 1992). 
In some domains, knowledge of the causal factors in goal and plan interactions will be 
needed in order to characterize when to use particular plans. For example, natural categories 
reflect learning the features "animate" and "inanimate" as critical concepts (Smith & Medin, 
1981; Mandler, 1991). This is not simply because it is possible to divide the natural world 
into living and nonliving things; certainly, many other such criteria are possible (such as, 
external versus internal gestation) and are correlated with desirable information. Rather, 
recognizing the class of objects that are animate, and therefore capable of self-initiation, 
allows one to make plans that take into account possible actions on the part of those objects. 
The "animate" feature serves to activate expectations about how these actions may affect 
one's own goals. Thus, it is an important predictive feature in the natural world when making 
decisions about how to deal with objects in the environment. Within planning domains, 
then, we propose that the commonalities in the features that serve as useful indices are likely 
to be based on those features that predict successful pursuit of one's goals. 
Other, equally related surface and structural features may be present in a domain, such 
as preconditions necessary for plan execution. However, unless these features are capable 
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of distinguishing one goal pursuit situation from another, learning them is in a sense "aca- 
demic": only distinctive features, whether surface or structural, provide predictive indices. 
A purely correlational learner such as Anderson's rational analysis model (Anderson, 1991) 
could find some predictive features, if the world is kind enough to isolate them in different 
types of causal problems. For example, correlated features may be used to signal prob- 
lem types (as "incline plane" problems in physics) (Chi, 1988). While this approach is 
often successful, it will be unable to learn the types of non-observable structural features 
predictive of goal satisfaction in RUNNER. Unless these causal features are computed and 
encoded into memory, a model will be unable to learn the important features needed to 
distinguish appropriate plans across problem contexts. Of course, correlational models 
could be adapted to incorporate this ability to attend to structural and predictive features; 
however, exactly how to accomplish this, and a theory of what those features are likely to 
be in the planning domain, is what our predictive features model provides. 
7. Conclusion 
Our approach to learning predictive features not only describes what people do learn, it 
also suggests what people shouM learn in a functional sense, and therefore what knowledge 
learning programs must be capable of acquiring. In this collaborative enterprise, the psy- 
chological experiments confirm that human memory access to prior cases can be facilitated 
by cues that contain particular predictive structural features. This evidence lends support to 
case-based models as potential models of human reasoning and memory; more specifically, 
our results have shown that human behavior is consistent with the case-based learning tenant 
that cases are indexed by the features that predict their applicability. The empirical studies 
in this collaboration confirm the ideas behind our computational models, rather than the 
specific behaviors of a particular implementation. 
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Notes 
1. One alternative approach is to design the agent so that it considers only relevant conditions, either by hand- 
crafting the decision procedure, or by a mixture of hand-crafting and clever compilation of declarative speci- 
fications (Rosenschein, 1986). 
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